On physicalism and downward causation in developmental and cancer biology

Abstract : The dominant position in Philosophy of Science contends that downward causation is an illusion. Instead, we argue that downward causation doesn't introduce vicious circles either in physics or in biology. We also question the metaphysical claim that "physical facts fix all the facts." Downward causation does not imply any contradiction if we reject the assumption of the completeness and the causal closure of the physical world that this assertion contains. We provide an argument for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, this allows us to reconsider the concept of diachronic emergence.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [49 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-univ-tlse2.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00714937
Contributor : Paul-Antoine Miquel <>
Submitted on : Friday, August 30, 2013 - 4:41:28 AM
Last modification on : Friday, August 2, 2019 - 4:18:13 PM
Long-term archiving on : Friday, March 31, 2017 - 10:18:16 AM

File

Def_Manuscript_AB_2008.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00714937, version 1

Collections

Citation

A.M. Soto, Sonnenschein Carlos, Paul-Antoine Miquel. On physicalism and downward causation in developmental and cancer biology. Acta Biotheoretica, Springer Verlag, 2008, 56 (4), pp.257-274. ⟨hal-00714937⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

418

Files downloads

734