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‘Focus of Attention’ in discourse

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Abstract

The four Topic statuses recognized in FG (“Given”, “Sub”, “Resumed” and “New”) appear to subsume the distinction in Columbia School linguistics (CS) between “Focus” (a two-level set of instructions to the addressee to treat the content of the constituent so-marked as needing or as already assuming a high(er) or a low(er) degree of attention concentration on his/her part) and “Deixis” (a three-way scale of “insistent urging” encoded by given pronouns or demonstratives that the addressee locate the intended referent). In this chapter, I critically examine these two partially overlapping systems, suggesting a partial synthesis, and then re-assess the four-way Topic distinction in FG in terms of this account of the CS ‘Focus’-‘Deixis’ system. My aim is to pinpoint the nature of the discourse-level phenomena being captured by the two approaches, in order to determine the extent to which each theory can benefit from the other’s insights. Finally, I suggest how the resulting conception of the topic function within discourse might be integrated into the new Functional Discourse Grammar model.

1. Introduction

My goal in this chapter is to compare two functionalist theories of indexical reference in discourse in terms of topichood, seeking both to critically evaluate each in its own terms, as well as in terms one of the other. Ultimately, I aim to show where each theory may usefully illuminate the other, resulting in a more adequate overall account of this complex and still not fully understood area of language use.

I will begin by characterizing in Section 2 the North-American Columbia School of Linguistics’ account of what it calls the ‘Focus’ and ‘Deixis’ systems of attention concentration in discourse, and will then re-examine in Section 3 the four Topic subtypes recognised in standard FG (Dik 1997a: Ch. 13; also Hannay 1985a, 1985b, 1991; Bolkestein 1998, 2000; Mackenzie & Keizer 1991; Siewierska 1991: Ch. 6; Gómez-González 2001) in the light of the earlier characterization of these systems. Finally, Section 4 briefly discusses how the conception of topic (and focus) assignment which emerges from this comparison might be integrated into the new Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) model put forward by Kees Hengeveld (this volume).

In terms of this new ‘Functional Discourse Grammar’ framework, the assignments of Topic and Focus functions which I shall be discussing clearly fall within the ‘Interpersonal Level’ recognised within this format - the nature of these ‘pragmatic functions’ arguing strongly in favour of the ‘top-down’ relationship between the three ‘descending’ levels of (respectively) ‘Interpersonal’, ‘Representational’ and ‘Expression’ which structure the new model.

A brief word, first of all, on the Columbia School (CS), which is relatively little known as such in Europe (even though the work of several CS linguists is individually quite well known: the work of Robert Kirsner on the Dutch demonstratives, of Erica García on the Spanish clitic pronoun system, or of Ricardo Otheguy on the Spanish articles, to take but three examples). The Columbia School, founded by the late William Diver, is a functionalist sign-based theory which rests on the twin pillars of Saussurean structuralism and the primacy of the communicative function of language. It is an avowedly inductive theory, suspicious of *a priori* categories, notions and constructs. All such theoretical devices must be demonstrated to be needed on the basis of evidence of patterning in actual texts (there are shades of FG here - though CS adheres much more strictly to this principle).

CS linguists seek out the existence of micro-systems such as those of tense, aspect, mood, number, case, the demonstratives, and so on, in terms of Saussurean constellations of ‘values’ (so-called “signal-meaning” hypotheses: the existence of systematic oppositions of forms correlated with systematic oppositions in meaning, or sense (‘signified’ in Saussurean terms) within the micro-system). From the user’s point of view, an actual ‘message’ is fleshed out on the basis of a given set of values expressed via certain signals belonging to the systems at issue, in conjunction with relevant features of the context (cotext and context-of-utterance —including the speaker/writer’s hypothesized intentions in producing the utterance in question). That is, as in Sperber & Wilson’s “Relevance Theory” of understanding in context, as also in standard FG and the new FDG model, the formal structure of an utterance (CS does not recognise the traditional category ‘sentence’) always underdetermines the message(s) which it can serve to convey, given particular contexts. The gap between (structural) meaning (or ‘signified’), based on given networks of formal and semantic oppositions, and message has to be bridged via inferences on the part of the language user.

CS linguists operate very much within the frontier between clausal structure and textual product, in the sense that they make heavy use of text counts of given features and their combinations, leading to statistically significant tendencies or “skewings” across texts from different genres. These skewings, once apparent, are then used as empirical validations of the hypotheses set up to describe and account for the behaviour of given forms in context. The introduction by Ellen Contini-Morava to the 1995 volume (listed in the bibliography) edited by her and B.S. Goldberg, gives a very good overview of CS theory.

2. The systems of ‘FOCUS’ and ‘DEIXIS’ in the Columbia School of Linguistics

2.1 ‘FOCUS’

The CS conception of Focus should not be confused with the sense of ‘Focus’ in FG terms (in the context of so-called ‘Information Structure’ (henceforth IS): see Gundel 1999; Cornish 1999: §5.3.2, 2000a: §2.2, for clarification of the relationship between these two senses of ‘Focus’ in the literature). The reader will need to be alert to this in what follows, and to keep his or her eye firmly on the terminological ball. To keep the

two intended senses of *focus* distinct, I will capitalize this term when referring to the CS conception, and will use lower case for the FG one.

‘FOCUS’ in CS terminology does not mean “the most important information conveyed by a clause, representing the difference between $P(A)_S$ (the speaker’s representation of the addressee’s current state of pragmatic knowledge) and (P_S) (the speaker’s own current state of pragmatic knowledge)”, as in the standard FG account, but rather “what the speaker is assuming the hearer is already concentrating on, what s/he has at the forefront of his/her consciousness at the time of utterance”. This is therefore more akin to the FG notion of ‘Topic’ than of ‘Focus’. Only participants (arguments) with respect to the ‘Event’ represented in a clause fall within the CS FOCUS systems. The CS value NOT IN-FOCUS is then (confusingly) equivalent by default to the information-structural sense of Focus - although there is no prediction within CS theory that constituents bearing this value will in fact have Focus status (in the Information Structure sense). Wallis Reid (pers. comm.) confirms my understanding that ‘IN-FOCUS’ status is in fact equivalent to that of ‘Topic’ in the IS sense, and that ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’ equates with ‘non-topical’. He goes on to point out that the value ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’ only applies to participants that *could* have been IN-FOCUS (i.e. clausal topics). The instruction conveyed to the understander via a constituent bearing the value [IN-FOCUS] (the case of the term *Jane* in (1a) below, under its topic-comment interpretation) is ‘pay more attention to the referent at issue, as it will be important in the subsequent discourse’, and via one carrying the value [NOT IN-FOCUS] (*a tarantula* in (1a), and, presumably, the entire sentence in (1b)), ‘pay somewhat less attention to the referent involved’.

- (1) a *Jane* [IN-FOCUS] *has just spotted a tarantula* [NOT IN-FOCUS]
(categorical utterance: “predicate-focus”, in Lambrecht’s, 1994 terminology).

b *A bomb exploded yesterday morning in Armington Valley high street.* (thetic utterance: “sentence focus” *pace* Lambrecht, 1994).

I am assuming here that in the immediate context of (1a), the discourse has been dealing with ‘Jane’, that is, that this referent is ‘topical’ in Dik’s (1997a) sense of the term. Thus, (1a) should be understood as a reply to the question *What did Jane do?, or What about Jane?*, where the IS Focus would correspond to the content of the VP *has just spotted a tarantula*. Alternatively, (1a) could be a response to the question *What has Jane just seen/spotted?*, where the IS Focus would correspond to the direct-object argument *a tarantula* alone (“Jane has just seen/spotted something” being presupposed, following Erteschik-Shir 1997: 13). (1a) may be analyzed as an instance of the classic “topic-comment” (categorical) information structure, since a relation of “aboutness” may easily be attributed to the referent of the subject expression and to the denotation of the predicator-cum-second argument (given the type of context indicated above), as expressed in (1a’):

- (1) a’ *As for/About Jane, she has just spotted a tarantula.*

- (1) a’’ *#As for/About a tarantula, it has just been spotted by Jane.*

(1a''), which is very unnatural as a paraphrase of the relevant part of (1a), clearly shows that the A₂ 'a tarantula' does not bear the topic (i.e. [IN-FOCUS]) relation with regard to the remainder of the utterance.

Two well-known problems with assessing written, decontextualised sentences of the type in (1a) are first, precisely the lack of a context which would enable the assignment of a given information-structural analysis on the basis of that context; and second, the lack of an explicit prosodic structure which would motivate that assignment. This latter point makes itself felt particularly acutely in English.

(1b) as a *thetic* utterance does not presuppose any particular prior context; as such, it could occur discourse-initially. CS would not assign IN-FOCUS status to the subject term *a bomb* here, since the predication is intransitive. As such, it would be assigned the value 'MORE FOCUS (needed)' (see below), in comparison to inverted constructions where the subject term is postverbal. The fact that the value 'MORE FOCUS (needed)' is assigned to this referent correctly predicts that it is not (yet) topical: for here there is no "aboutness" relation involved between its referent and the proposition; the entire utterance is *thetic* (presented as 'all-new' information to the addressee) - an event-reporting utterance in Lambrecht's (1994) terms. That the argument expression *a bomb*, in subject position, does not bear the topic, or [IN-FOCUS] relation with respect to the remainder of the utterance, is shown by (1b'):

- (1) b' #*As for/About a bomb, it/one exploded yesterday morning in Armington Valley high street.*

Now, there is an ambivalence in the conception of FOCUS within the CS framework: on the one hand, an item signalled as IN-FOCUS represents information which the speaker is assuming the addressee is already concentrating on; and on the other, the addressee is being tacitly instructed to maintain the concentration differential between this IN-FOCUS item and other NOT IN-FOCUS items, for the immediately ongoing discourse. The following quotation from Huffman (f.c), p. 31, reflects this ambivalence:

- (2) The system of Focus deals with the centering of attention on one of the participants in an event. The opposition here is a binary one: a participant is either IN FOCUS or NOT IN FOCUS. *A participant IN FOCUS is thereby stated to be the center of attention with respect to the particular event, and when a participant is signalled to be NOT IN FOCUS, the speaker is asserting that this one **should not have** the hearer's attention focused on it.* (Huffman, f.c., p. 31: my emphasis and italics-FC)

Although for convenience, illustrations of the FOCUS system are often given in the context of a single clause, CS linguists point out that it can only really be detected within a complete text, since it is the relation of participants to the wider discourse which the participant FOCUS values instantiate. The Columbia School system of 'FOCUS' has two basic values, then, restricted to encoded differential attention contrasts solely with respect to the arguments of finite verbs : for canonical transitive predications (in FG

terminology, A₁ subject - predicator - A₂ object), ‘IN-FOCUS’ for the A₁ subject, and ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’ for the A₂ object (Reid, 1991:178). The latter value (‘NOT IN-FOCUS’) would also be attributed to a third participant (i.e. an argument which is “nuclear”, that is, not preceded by a preposition), as in *John bought Mary a book*. The predicator is not involved in the CS FOCUS system, only argument expressions (i.e. ones denoting ‘participants’) are. As suggested above, this distinction would appear to hold only in the case of so-called *categorical* utterances, where the utterance as a whole may be construed as conveying information about the entity denoted by the topic (here subject) expression - although CS linguists do not appear to draw the distinction between *categorical* and *thetic* utterances. All entities coded as non-participants (i.e. non-nuclear arguments, as well as satellites, in FG terminology) - e.g. via a prepositional phrase - are *ipso facto* presented as not entering the FOCUS system at all. In languages possessing case-marked clitic pronouns, nominative clitics signal ‘HIGHER-FOCUS’, while non-nominative clitics signal ‘LOWER-FOCUS’.

As already mentioned, where there is only one participant, in an intransitive clause, for example, the two values are said to be MORE FOCUS for the participant in preverbal subject position, and LESS FOCUS when it is postposed. The contrast here is then between two construction types, not one between participants (arguments) within the same predication. That is, these word order signals form an oppositional micro-system (see in particular Huffman 1993 and Reid 1991: 180-81 (ex. (29)) for justification and practical illustration based on attested texts). (3a,b) from Reid (1991) illustrate:

(3) a *A fly* (MORE FOCUS) *was swimming in my soup*. (Reid 1991, ex. (26))

b *There was a fly* (LESS FOCUS) *in my soup*. (Reid 1991, ex. (27))

Note that both (3a) and (3b) may be analyzed as *thetic* utterances, not as *categorical* ones. Reid’s annotation here goes some way towards implying this in (3a), since the assignment of ‘MORE FOCUS (needed)’ (as in the case of the term *the bomb* in example (1b) above) entails that the referent at issue is not already ‘IN-FOCUS’ (i.e. topical). As such, neither occurrence of the NP *a fly* would be construed as a topic expression, both of them necessarily carrying a high level of pitch-accent. Now, while the analysis ‘LESS FOCUS (needed)’ may be plausible as an interpretation of *a fly* in (3b), that of ‘MORE FOCUS (needed)’ is not evidently so in the case of the token functioning as subject in (3a), since the *thetic* interpretation of the containing utterance here treats the referent of this expression, not as an entity having a separate existence, but as an integral part of the situation conveyed as a whole (see for example Siewierska 1991: 161-2, who says of her comparable example (18b) *A tiger chased a tourist*: “...in using (18b) the primary purpose of the speaker is not to present the referents but to establish the event”; see also on this point Hannay 1991: 146).

In fact, (3b) involves not just inversion, but also so-called ‘*there*-insertion’, a specifically ‘existential’ construction. In this connection, Birner & Ward (1998: 102-6) argue that there is a discourse-pragmatic constraint affecting the postverbal NP in this construction, to the effect that its referent must not be “hearer-old” (i.e. assumed to be already familiar/known to the hearer); no such constraint is claimed to regulate the

“canonical” word-order variant, as seen in (3a), however. This restriction may be seen to stem from what Hannay (1985a: 101) argues is the *raison d'être* of presentative constructions of this kind, namely to “assert the existence of an entity or state of affairs in the discourse world”.

Siewierska (1991: 161-2) distinguishes between the two construction types also within an FG framework in suggesting that sentences of type (3a) serve to report a bare event, while existential ones, as in (3b), function to introduce or present and highlight a specific entity (or alternatively, a state of affairs as a whole). Huffman (1993) presents the three construction types as a three-way decreasing scale of FOCUS marking: subject-verb order conferring a high level of attention focus on the referent of the subject term, that of verb-subject a lower or mid level, and the *there* + subject + expansion (in Hannay’s 1985a analysis), the lowest level of the three.

(4b) is a naturally-occurring example, contrasted with (4a), which is adapted from it. The immediate left-hand and right-hand co-text of (4b) is given under (4b’) and (4b’’), respectively. Moreover, the immediate macro-topic of the segment in which (4b’), (4b) and (4b’’) occur is ‘the city of Antibes’.

(4) a *...the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château is of greater interest.*

b *...of greater interest is the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château.*

(Extract from *The Holiday Which? Guide to France* by A.Ruck, 1982, p. 112)

(4) b’ *...In the old town [of Antibes] the cathedral, like so many others, has an ill-lit Bréa* (4b).

(4) b’’ *...(4b’) + (4b) The rest of Antibes is a modern and bustling resort...*

In comparing (4a) and (4b) as occurring in the left- and right-hand contexts specified in (4b’) and (4b’’), respectively, it would seem that for the subject-predicate ordering as in (4a) to be fully coherent and natural in this context, the adversative connective *but* would be expected preceding it. The force of this connective is in fact implicit in the original predicate-subject ordering as in (4b), the attested version, but the surface presence of this item is not essential in such a context. I would suggest that the reason for the choice of predicate-subject ordering in (4b) is entirely due to the need to relate (4b) to (4b’), its immediate context, via a relation of comparative contrast. The very fact of mentioning a feature of a town in a travel guide such as this (here the fact that Antibes cathedral has an “ill-lit Bréa”) implies that it is potentially ‘of interest’ to the prospective visitor. This is then the topic of utterance (4b) (‘features of potential interest to the visitor to Antibes’), and is the reason why the prepositional phrase is preposed in this context, connecting directly in this way with its immediate discourse context. In FG terms, it would be placed in P₁ position - an intra-clausal position reserved (among other features) for constituents bearing special pragmatic values. This, then, is the common thematic feature holding between the two sentences, in terms of which the propositions they express are connected. See Hannay (1991: 145) for a presentation and analysis of a very similar example (his (19a)). Hannay notes that the preposed adjectival phrase

Particularly interesting... in his example is “topical inferrable information” (on the basis of the immediate context which he provides), and that it is a “staging device” rather than a Topic *per se*. As with CS theory, so with FG only nominal expressions (terms) may be assigned one of the Topic functions.

Now, one may agree with the CS analysis here that the referent of the term *the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château* in (4a) is the (new) topic of this utterance (*As for the Picasso museum, this/it is of greater interest*), and therefore bears the value ‘[MORE FOCUS (needed)]’, since it is the subject of an *intransitive* predication; and that the predicational prepositional phrase *of greater interest* is non-topical, not participating in the FOCUS system (since it does not correspond to a participant —i.e. argument, in FG terms).

But surely this degree of [FOCUS] (i.e. concentration of attention) on the preverbal term in (4a) is not greater than that which the inversion construction illustrated in (4b) manifests? Of course, the difficulty here is that we are in grave danger of confusing the CS sense of Focus (and what it is applied to) and the information-structural one. CS would say that more attention-focus is concentrated on the preverbal term in the non-inverted construction in (4a) than on the postverbal one in (4b). At the same time, it is apparent that in their spoken realizations, the comparative adjective *greater* in (4a) (being part of the information-structure focus) would have a more prominent pitch-accent on it than it would in (4b). The placing of the subject term *the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château* in postverbal predicate position in (4b) seems indeed to “direct the attention of the hearer(s) to its intension, by being uttered” (Erteschik-Shir 1997: 11), which is how this linguist defines the IS sense of Focus; but this is not the case in (4a), where it is in preverbal, canonical subject position. Erteschik-Shir’s (1997: (14), Ch. 1) “lie-test” confirms this difference. The ‘lie-test’ consists in contradicting various parts of an utterance, and seeing whether the connection between the two utterances is coherent (the crosshatch indicates lack of full coherence). It is essentially a test of what is asserted in the utterance at issue (Erteschik-Shir 1997: 15), and so reflects the potential IS Focus domain(s).

(5) a A: *...of greater interest is the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château.*

b B: *That’s not true! The ill-lit Bréa is much more interesting...*

(adapted from the context of (4b) in *The Holiday Which? Guide to France*, 1982, p. 112 - i.e. (4b’))

Compare the naturalness of (5b) as a contradiction of the assertion in (5a), with the more bizarre character of (6b) as a contradiction of the information conveyed by the preverbal PP in (5a) (here, (6a)):

(6) a A: *...of greater interest is the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château.*

b B: *#That’s not true! Of no interest at all is that museum.*

Clearly then, by the ‘lie-test’ the most prominent information in (4b) is that associated with the postverbal term, not the preverbal one. And the inversion construction seems equally clearly to place even greater informational prominence on the postverbal term than is the case in the unmarked topic-comment construction illustrated in (4a).

The CS claim, then, that inversion constructions such as (3b) and (4b) involve the signalling of less attention on the postverbal referent than on the preverbal one in non-inverted constructions seems to be valid only under the “epistemic” interpretation of the CS FOCUS systems - where the addressee's attention is simply assumed not already to be concentrated on the referent at issue. Otherwise there would appear to be a clear conflict in discourse values: for CS theory, the postverbal subject acts as an instruction to the addressee to “pay LESS attention to the referent of this term (than if it had occurred in preverbal subject position)”; and for IS linguists (Erteschik-Shir, Lambrecht, and others - including Dik and other FG linguists), “the referent of this term is focal information, to which the addressee's attention is specifically being directed”.

In this regard, Birner & Ward (1998: 156-194) argue that the function of the preverbal constituent in inversion constructions is to link the utterance to the prior discourse context (see the PP *of greater interest* in the attested example (4b)), and that, for the inversion to be felicitous, the postverbal constituent must not represent information which is more “discourse-old” than that of the preverbal one. This is clearly the case with the term *the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château* in (4b). Moreover, the verb in inversion constructions is a “light” one: intransitive, copular, or denoting existence or emergence and so forth.

For Huffman (1993), verb-subject ordering (where it is possible) is a means of unobtrusively introducing a new referent, with maximum continuity with respect to the preceding co-text. Subject-verb ordering, on the other hand, always assumes that the subject term's referent is important and salient in relation to the immediate concerns of the current discourse; thus, when a new referent is introduced in this position, there is an effect of discontinuity which is not apparent in the case of verb-subject ordering.

In the text from which (4b) was taken, the subsequent co-text does not go on to mention the referent concerned (‘the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château’) - but neither does it do so in the case of ‘the cathedral’ in (4b’), whose referent is in fact introduced via subject-verb ordering in this sentence. And unlike the term *the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château* in (4b), *the cathedral* in (4b’) would receive the value ‘IN-FOCUS’, since it is the preverbal subject of a transitive, and not intransitive, predication. In the case of these three sentences ((4b’), (4b) and (4b’’)), the subject expressions *the cathedral* (‘IN-FOCUS’), *the Picasso museum in the old Grimaldi château* (‘LESS FOCUS (needed)’), and *the rest of Antibes* (‘MORE FOCUS (needed)’)) would all correspond to the FG Topic type known as ‘Sub Topic’, since they each pick out a specific feature of the town of Antibes, the immediate macro-topic of the text unit in which they occur. It is this more macro-discourse relation which, in my view, makes for the coherence of these three sentences (in the order in which they actually occur in the text) - the writer's assumption that the reader can easily infer the intended ‘part-whole’ relation between the referents of the two preverbal subject expressions and the immediate

macro-topic lessening the ‘tension’ created by the placing of (relatively) new material in this position.

Is it possible, then, that the feature which Huffman ascribes to texts generally is in fact genre-specific (occurring no doubt in narrative texts - W. Golding's *Lord of the Flies* and W. Cather's *O Pioneers!*, used as a testing ground by Huffman, but not in travel guides such as the one illustrated by the extracts in (4b'), (4b) and (4b'))?

One last general point about CS FOCUS systems: given that, as Hannay (1991: 140), Reinhart (1981: 56), Lambrecht (1994), Erteschik-Shir (1997) and others point out, a given clause may sustain several different topic and focus assignments, depending on its context at the utterance level, *postverbal* argument terms (direct and indirect objects) *may* fulfil the topic function. CS theory, as presently constituted, would seem to have no means of predicting these possibilities.

2.2 ‘DEIXIS’

‘DEIXIS’ in CS terms, on the other hand, is said to constitute a grammatical system whose substance (in Saussurean terms) is ‘degree of insistent pointing toward the intended referent’ (cf. Diver, n.d., 1995: 34-7 on the Latin demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns; Leonard, 1995 on the Swahili demonstratives, and Aoyama, 1995 on the Japanese ones). The degree of ‘DEIXIS’ (required concentration of the addressee’s attention) is claimed (Diver, n.d., p. 12) to reflect the following principle:

- G. The more obvious the referent, the lower the item [indexical expression - FC] on the deictic scale used to refer to it.

The ‘deictic scale’ which Diver (p. 11) gives in this respect is formulated in terms of the Latin demonstratives (see also Dik’s 1997b: 223 similar table (21) structured in terms of preferred choices of Latin indexical forms for realizing NewTops, Focus, and GivTops, as well as Bolkestein 2000, for FG). Bolkestein examines the discourse conditions under which each of these forms (with the exception of *ipse*) occur, including of course the zero subject pronoun, which would be placed at the extreme low end of the scale in (7), as well as the subject relative pronoun *qui*.

	HIGHEST
	<i>ipse</i>
	<i>hic</i>
(7) Deixis	<i>iste</i>
	<i>ille</i>
	<i>is</i>
	<i>se</i>
	LOWEST

Iipse, the emphatic demonstrative, is at the highest end of the scale, and the clitic reflexive *se* is at the lowest end: its referent is normally what is in focus with respect to the associated finite verb (that is, where it exists, the nominative expression ('subject', not recognized as a category in CS theory, as already indicated) via the reflexive relation, the nominative term and verb inflection already encoding HIGH FOCUS. According to Principle G, the less obvious the speaker assumes the intended referent in context to be for the addressee, the more a form from the upper part of the scale will tend to be used, and correspondingly, the more obvious, the more one from the lower part will tend to be chosen. Hence, to use my own English example, in (8), the distal demonstrative determiner is used initially, since the intended referent is new to the discourse, the addressee being assumed not already to have noticed it:

- (8) [It is dusk, and John and Mary are returning from a shopping trip. As John is parking the car, Mary exclaims:]

*Good God! Look at **that** incredibly bright light!* [Mary gestures towards a point in the evening sky] *What on earth do you think it could be?* (Cornish, 1999: ex. (2.6a), p. 26)

Here, the indexically 'stronger' determiner *that*, together with the lexical component of the term and the associated gesture, are used initially, since the addressee 'John' is assumed not already to be attending to the bright light in question; while the indexically 'weaker' ordinary pronoun *it* is used in the second sentence to refer back to something assumed by this point to be within his attention focus.

But it is not just the 'degree of obviousness' of a given referent in a discourse which is the criterial factor in the organisation of the field of 'DEIXIS', in the CS sense. It is also, and mainly, that referent's degree of importance, as judged by the speaker, within the immediate discourse at the point of use, which determines which form will be chosen from within the relevant scale. This is the so-called 'direct' strategy for referent establishment.

'DEIXIS', in the CS conception, is claimed to be encoded by (among other expression-types) clitic pronouns of different varieties. Clitic reflexive pronouns in languages such as Latin, French and Spanish (but not in English, where reflexive pronouns are not clitic and so have different distributional properties) signal the lowest degree of DEIXIS (in this sense of the term), namely that very little effort need be expended by the addressee in order to retrieve the intended referent - why? Presumably because it is 'IN-FOCUS' ; and non-nominative, non-reflexive clitics signal a high(er) level of DEIXIS - since here, the intended referent is no doubt (assumed to be) 'NOT IN-FOCUS'. Let us take the ambiguous example (9) from French as a basis for illustration:

- (9) *Elle* [LOW DEIXIS] *sait bien que la décision lui* [HIGH/LOW DEIXIS] *incombe.*

'*She*_i well knows that the decision is up to *him*_k/*her*_{i;j}'

One point which (9) immediately illustrates is that, contrary to CS predictions, under the coreferential interpretation of the subject pronoun *elle* and the dative clitic pronoun *-lui*, both pronoun forms must bear identical '(LOW) DEIXIS' status, the coreferential interpretation pulling the dative clitic within the dominion of the 'antecedent' subject one (see Van Hoek, 1997 for this type of approach to pronominal anaphora, within Langacker's Cognitive Grammar framework). Under the non-coreferential interpretation, it is possible that the DEIXIS status of the two referents concerned differs. (9) shows the difficulty encountered by accounts such as the CS one (also Gundel et al.'s, 1993 "Givenness Hierarchy"), which frame their scales in terms of individual lexical items, rather than in terms of given uses of forms.

2.3 The CS 'FOCUS' and 'DEIXIS' systems compared

However, this distinction between the subsystems of 'FOCUS' and 'DEIXIS' is not entirely convincing, since it fails to capture what is common to both (which is a good deal, in fact) in a revealing way. In addition, there is the ever-present danger of redundancy, depending on which definition of the 'FOCUS' system is retained: that is, "attention is already concentrated on a given referent", or "attention needs to be so concentrated". It would be tempting to suggest (as would seem logical, after all) that (a) the very same morphemes which encode the value LOW DEIXIS are signals of HIGH/CENTRAL FOCUS, and that (b) those morphemes signalling HIGH DEIXIS simultaneously encode the value LOW/PERIPHERAL FOCUS. There is evidence for the (b) relationship in the shape of the French clitic complement pronouns *lui-*, *leur-*, *le-*, *la-*, and *les-*, which are said to encode the values PERIPHERAL (= LOW) FOCUS and HIGH DEIXIS (see Huffman's 1997: 211 Figure 5.3). In the case of (a), however, the French reflexive *se* is claimed to encode the values LOW DEIXIS, but also PERIPHERAL (LOW) FOCUS (Huffman 1997: 211). Yet it is at least plausible that an alternative analysis in terms of CENTRAL FOCUS might be made of French *se*, owing to its obligatory coreference with the nominative term ('subject') which acts as its controller (see also footnote 13 above). For García (1977: 152), Spanish *se* is outside the FOCUS system altogether.

Furthermore, in the case of Latin, as Wallis Reid (pers. comm.) points out, the demonstratives *ipse* and *hic* are at the top of the Deictic Scale (see (7) above), and so clearly encode the value HIGH DEIXIS; and yet since both pronouns may be fully declined, each may take nominative case (giving them HIGH FOCUS status) or alternatively an oblique case (where they would signal LOW or PERIPHERAL FOCUS: in the latter case, this combination would be as predicted by (b) above). Similarly, the demonstrative *is*, which occurs near the bottom of the Deictic Scale in (7), may take nominative case, and so encode the value HIGH FOCUS (this would correspond to the predicted relationship described under (a) above, in fact).

Now, given that these combinations hold, how can we make sense of the apparently contradictory instructions which the 'non-conforming' combinations signal? That is, HIGH FOCUS + HIGH DEIXIS: "the intended referent is assumed already to be in the addressee's attention focus, but will need a high degree of effort in order to locate it"; and LOW FOCUS + LOW DEIXIS: "the intended referent is not assumed already to

be in the addressee's attention focus, but at the same time it is not necessary to expend a great deal of effort in order to locate it". In my view, the only sensible interpretation of these apparently contradictory combinations of instructions would be as follows: "the intended referent is/is not already in the addressee's attention focus (FOCUS system), but the referent at issue is/is not important for the current discourse purpose (DEIXIS system)". Thus, it is the 'direct', not the 'indirect' strategy associated with the DEIXIS system which necessarily comes to the fore in such cases.

More thought clearly needs to be given to these kinds of relationships between the various values encoded by given forms from within the two systems at issue here, in order to try to better integrate the two complementary systems of DEIXIS and FOCUS in CS theory.

3. The four Topic statuses recognized in standard FG

Functional Grammar uses both discourse-pragmatic and formal-coding criteria to distinguish topics in relation to foci. Two basic properties of discourse relevant to topic and focus status are those of *topicality* and *focality*, considered as functions of the speaker's assumptions regarding his/her addressee's current pragmatic knowledge state at any given point in the discourse. 'Topicality' has to do with the set of referents "about" which information is to be provided or requested in the discourse" (Dik 1997a: 312). This notion is close to Brown & Yule's (1983) concept *topic framework*. 'Focality', on the other hand, "attaches to those pieces of information which are the most important or salient with respect to the modifications which S [the Speaker] wishes to effect in P_A [the addressee's current state of pragmatic knowledge], and with respect to the further development of the discourse" (Dik 1997a: 312). Importantly, 'topicality' and 'focality' are not mutually exclusive: areas where they overlap include constructions involving contrastive or parallel focus. The 'aboutness' test which we used in §2.1 is employed to determine the topic relation between an entity and a predication, as is the Question-Answer test (which also determines the potential focus domain(s) of the utterance concerned). The latter test establishes the degree to which a given (declarative) utterance may be construed as a natural or coherent response to a question about a specified referent, providing the information required. This type of test is criticised by Gómez-González (2001), though it would seem that no very convincing evidence is marshalled against it.

Now, Lambrecht's (1994: §4.1.2) important distinction between *topic-referent* and *topic-expression* is reflected in the FG approach to topicality and topic assignment, in that the tests just mentioned serve to isolate the *referent* bearing the topic function in relation to a given focus domain within an utterance. Whereas the various formal criteria needing to be satisfied in order for a constituent to be analyzed as Topic obviously relate to the topic expression, in Lambrecht's terms. That is, in order for a discourse entity to be recognized as a Topic of some kind, its linguistic exponent must be singled out in a systematic way by the language system involved: via morphological form, a particle, a specific type of construction (e.g. the left-detached construction), a specific word order pattern, or a particular prosodic form. As we shall see, this form-oriented aspect of topic recognition in FG has taken priority over the discourse-cognitive dimension (as

developed in Reinhart 1981, or Lambrecht 1994, for example), in that it has motivated the recognition of a topic type known as “New Topic”. However, according to the discourse-cognitive criteria, such referents are not topics at all within the clause in which they are expressed - rather they are clearly focal (see the references listed in footnote 23 on this issue). Moreover, it has led one pair of authors within FG (Mackenzie & Keizer 1991) to conclude that no Topic function exists at all in English, since according to them, there is no systematic coding in that language which would single out expressions bearing the topic function in relation to other, non-topical expressions (but see Hannay 1991: 142, fn. 9 for an opposing view). I believe that this over-reliance on systematic, overt coding as the main condition determining the existence of particular pragmatic functions in a language is a reflection of the fact that the assignment of such functions is standardly assumed to take place within the grammar, as the final specification before the complete underlying clause structure representation is transferred to the Expression component for its formal realization. A number of linguists within FG have argued against this locating of the pragmatic function assignment within the grammar, for a variety of reasons (e.g. Vet 1998, Bolkestein 1998, Van den Berg 1998; more recently the type of model presented by Hengeveld (this volume) is conducive to representing the looser kind of relationship between a ‘pragmatic module’ and a ‘grammatical’ one, which these authors argue for. See also Hannay's (1991) five proposed ‘message management modes’ (to be discussed in Section 4 below) and their relevance for grammatical coding).

Now, as Siewierska (1991: 148) points out, the subdivision of the Topic function within FG was designed to relate the specification of clause structure to the wider discourse setting in which the clause under analysis may occur. The four Topic statuses recognized in FG (“Given”, “Sub”, “Resumed” and “New”) would appear to subsume the distinction in CS between “FOCUS” and “DEIXIS”. Given, Sub and Resumed Topics would realize CS ‘DEIXIS’, and New Topics, ‘FOCUS’ (i.e. they would correspond to the CS value ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’). FG GivTops, SubTops and ResTops clearly form a scale of ‘deicticity’, in the CS sense of the term, GivTops retrieving obvious referents, where no competition is involved between referents of the same type: examples used so far in this chapter are *it* in the second sentence of example (8), and *elle* in (9) (where this pronoun is unaccented).

SubTops require the drawing of a minimal inference from a contextually given set of entities to the existence of a particular member of that set, or from a whole to one of its parts, and so on —thus, encoding a slightly higher degree of ‘DEIXIS’ than that associated with GivTops: examples would be the preverbal subject terms *the cathedral* and *the rest of Antibes* in examples (4b’) and (4b’’) above. Both these definite terms manifest a part-whole relation within the immediate macro-topic of their containing discourse segment, namely ‘the city of Antibes’.

Finally, ResTops encode the highest degree of deicticity of the three subtypes, the referent being assumed to exist within the current discourse model, but no longer active or present in the addressee’s current consciousness. Thus the intended referent is assumed to be the least ‘obvious’ of the three at the point of use. An attested example is given under (10):

- (10) ...Elliot Morley, the Countryside minister, said he thought it was possible, with the new funds available, to aim at not just halting, but reversing the declines [of UK farmland bird species] in the medium term. “I’m in no doubt about the scale of *this task*, but I believe it is realistic to aim to do this by 2020”, he said. (Last paragraph of a 9-paragraph newspaper article ‘Ministers pledge £1bn to save farmland birds’, *The Independent*, 7 August 2000).

The demonstrative term *this task* in the third line of this extract refers back over the two preceding discourse units to the initial (macro-discourse) topic, introduced in the first, namely, the UK government's commitment to halt and reverse the massive decline in farmland bird species in that country by the year 2020. Neither of Dik's (1997a: Ch. 13) other two formal criteria supposedly accompanying terms with the ResTop function appear here, however (a connective indicating the start of a new discourse unit, and a specific reference back to the discourse unit to which the ResTop expression effects a return pop). It is the fact that the term itself occurs in a unit which is discourse-final, marking the conclusion of the discourse as a whole, I believe, which obviates the need for these two supposedly necessary conditions here. I will deal with the fourth subcategory of Topics recognized in FG (‘NewTops’) later in this Section.

Now, an important difference in emphasis arises as between the two theories, regarding the way in which each views the discourse function associated with the expression-types at issue. For FG (and also other cognitively-oriented approaches like the “Givenness Hierarchy” of Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski, 1993), the context-bound Topic functions are predicated solely on the discourse-cognitive status which the speaker is assuming the referent to enjoy in the addressee’s discourse model at the point of use; while for CS, on the other hand, the signals of ‘DEIXIS’ are said to serve as instructions to the addressee to concentrate a given level of attention on the referent involved: ‘HIGH’ - the referent is important to the current discourse concerns and so must be foregrounded relative to other referents; ‘MID’ - the referent is of medium importance with regard both to ‘HIGH DEIXIS’ and ‘LOW DEIXIS’ referents; and ‘LOW’ - the referent is of only background, “scene-setting” (for example) importance. As Leonard (1995) and Aoyama (1995), respectively, point out in relation to the attested Swahili and Japanese examples which they present, discourse referents are not simply designated “decrementally” with ever-decreasing levels of deixis marking as they are introduced, established, and maintained anaphorically throughout a discourse. Leonard’s (1995) ‘DEIXIS’ scale as realized by the Swahili demonstratives is given in (11):

- | | | |
|------|------------|-------------|
| (11) | <i>h</i> | HIGH DEIXIS |
| | <i>h-o</i> | MID DEIXIS |
| | <i>le</i> | LOW DEIXIS |

The Swahili ‘deixis’ system (Leonard, 1995, item (1), p.273)

The LOW DEIXIS Swahili demonstrative *-le* may indeed function anaphorically to maintain reference to a recently-introduced entity, by virtue of its differential deictic meaning: “no particular effort of concentration is needed to retrieve this referent”, as

illustrated in Leonard's (1995: 272) example (2a) (note that *-le* here would be glossed in English by the definite article *the*):

(12) *Alimwona kijana. Kijana yu-le alisimama mlangoni.*

'He saw a youth ; *le*-youth (LOW-DEIXIS) was standing at the door'

Clearly also, as expected, where a new referent is introduced into the discourse, and where that referent is also of importance to the speaker and to the current discourse purpose, a high-deixis marker is used:

(13) [An oathgiver explains an oathing procedure to a man. He says:]

'First I'll speak, you'll listen, then when I'm finished - *nataka wewe*
'I want you to

useme h-ivi "Mikale mikale..."

speak in *h-* (HIGH-DEIXIS) manner [i.e. say the following]: "*Mikale mikale...*" (Leonard, 1995, ex. (3))

The HIGH DEIXIS marker *h-* here is clearly equivalent to the English proximal demonstrative *this*, which Strauss (1993) argues is the HIGH DEIXIS member of the triplet *this/that/it* in that language, whereby the speaker is conveying a high degree of personal, subjective involvement with the referent, instructing the addressee to accord a high degree of attention-concentration on the referent, and to assume it is going to be important for the ensuing discourse. The distal demonstrative *that* is said to realize the value 'MID DEIXIS/-FOCUS', and the ordinary inanimate pronoun *it*, the value 'LOW DEIXIS/-FOCUS'. As with Leonard's (1995) attested examples of Swahili texts, Strauss gives examples where English 'HIGH DEIXIS' *this* is used in subsequent (instead of, or even as well as, initial) reference to a given entity:

(14) L 30 Caller: *You spoke a little while ago to a man.hhh with regard to uh law, //an' murder.*

Crandall: *Yes ma'am...*

L 70 Caller: *...you were talking about, or was he anyway, //that man*

Crandall: *well, no:: Now you see this the- again we come back to this: Murder is the act of killing someone, by, an- a specific dee:duh, described in the law of the sovereign state in which you live, as being unjustified.*

Caller: *Now/*

Caller *Yuh know/*

L 76 Caller: *By the d- conversation that chu had with **this man**: my impression was that there's something drastic'ly wrong with us as a nation.*

Because I- uh when you say, that the Federal government cannot interfere,,hh in u-uh:: condoned murder. Like you-

Crandall: [*In a- in a- in a murder case-*

Caller: [*Like you mentioned in Mississippi*

(Strauss, 1993: ex. (12))

Strauss points out (p. 410) that the use of the HIGH DEIXIS/-FOCUS expression *this man* in the first line of L 76, as fourth mention of the referent involved, is not evoking “new information”, but is rather motivated by the caller’s attempt to regain her turn, lost to Crandall at line 71. Another attested example (from my own corpus this time, here a newspaper article) is given under (15):

(15) [Beginning of article “God sends a sign to the heathen in a Chevy”, *The Independent*, 11 August 1999, p, 13]

“You are driving along in the relaxed American way, just getting from A to B and minding your own business, when your attention is grabbed by a gigantic billboard, “That ‘Love Thy Neighbour’ Thing”, reads the neat, white text, “I meant it - God”.

This particular hoarding, which thrust itself into my line of sight somewhere on Interstate 81 in southern Virginia at the weekend, is the latest in my growing collection of “God” adverts...”

From a purely “referent-tracking” point of view, there is clearly no motivation for the use of a HIGH DEIXIS marker at the start of the second paragraph of this extract. The particular billboard at issue has been introduced by the indefinite nominal *a gigantic billboard* in the first paragraph, and it is already in the reader’s focus of attention by the end of that paragraph. If the adjective *particular* were omitted from the second-mention demonstrative NP, then *that hoarding* or *the hoarding*, or even (if the appositive relative clause following it were absent too), simply *it*, would have been appropriate. The HIGH DEIXIS proximal demonstrative phrase is clearly chosen here in order to underline the writer’s empathy or strong subjective involvement with the referent at the point recounted in her car journey when she first noticed it - and also to signal the fact that the referent is being envisaged in a slightly different context in this second paragraph, as simply one of many such billboards proliferating along American highways (the generic topic of that and the subsequent paragraphs, in fact).

Nevertheless, the CS account of ‘DEIXIS’ in terms of three degrees of effort needed by the addressee to concentrate his/her attention on the intended referent is not general enough. I have argued (in Cornish 2001) that these progressively greater degrees, as we move up the scale, of “urging” or “insistent pointing” on the speaker’s part that the addressee attend to the referent may be predicted from what can be seen to be more basic cognitive-interactive values encoded by the members of a given ‘deictic scale’. If we take as a model the three English indexicals *this*, *that* and *it*, for example, then the

proximal (marked) variant has the effect of placing the referent within the speaker's discourse sphere, signalling his/her strong subjective involvement with that referent and allowing the inference that this referent does not constitute 'negotiated', mutually-validated information. From this and the 'egocentricity' principle which clearly regulates discourse interpretation generally, it can be deduced that the speaker considers the referent at issue to be highly important for the ensuing discourse, and that the addressee should pay special attention to it. Particular uses of *this* in English such as colloquial "indefinite" *this* and anticipatory or cataphoric *this* (both instances of discourse deixis in my view), as in (16a, b), are natural extensions of this value:

(16) a *There was **this** terrible boy at the circus, who...*

b *Now listen to **this**: a man went into a butcher's shop and bought a whole pig...*

The distal (unmarked) variant, *that*, would have the discourse-interactional value whereby its referent is placed outside the speaker's subjective sphere and into a shared, "negotiated" space, in which the speaker's and addressee's stances are in co-alignment. As such, the referent is not (necessarily) envisaged as representing new information for the addressee, and thus the somewhat lower degree of insistent urging that s/he attend to it is predicted (see also Cheshire 1996 and Glover 2000 for similar analyses of English *this* and *that*). The 'recognitional' or 'reminder' use of *that* provides a good illustration (see also the demonstrative term *that 'Love Thy Neighbour' thing* in example (15) above):

(17) *"Tony Blair was said to be on the phone last week to his German oppo, Chancellor Schröder, trying to talk through an upbeat final instalment of **that** dismal industrial soap opera called Longbridge..." (The Guardian, 3 May 2000, p. 12)*

Finally, the non-demonstrative, inanimate (unaccented) pronoun *it* signals not only that its intended referent constitutes shared information, but also that that information is currently in the addressee's (and the speaker's) ongoing attention focus. Again, this value implies that the addressee need expend no particular effort at all in locating and retrieving the intended referent, since it is (assumed to be) "right there", in his/her current consciousness.

Unlike both the CS account of 'DEIXIS' and the Gundel et al (1993) "Givenness Hierarchy", which are formulated in terms of particular lexical items, the four FG Topic types are characterized in terms of purely discourse-functional roles: although there are claimed to be certain prototypical indexical markers which realize such roles (zeros and unaccented 3rd person pronouns for GivTops, definite lexically-headed terms for SubTops, expanded definite or demonstrative terms for ResTops, and indefinite lexically-headed terms for NewTops), it is also clear that, in given contexts, other expression types may also be used to realize each of these functions (for example, the demonstratives, whether as determiners or pronouns, may in fact realize all of them —except ResTops, where demonstrative NPs rather than pronouns are required: see Cornish 1998 for some discussion, based on an English-language newspaper article).

This would seem to me to be desirable, since as we have seen, other, “strategic”-discourse as well as expressive and viewpoint-signalling factors come into play in addition to purely referent-tracking ones in the use of indexical expressions. However, no allowance seems to be made within FG for proactive, “strategic” uses, based on interactional or discourse-constructive motivations such as the ones which we briefly saw in examples (14)-(15). But the FG account has the advantage over the CS and the Givenness Hierarchy (GH) ones, in that specific lexical items are not “tied” to particular positions on a hierarchy of forms in terms of indexical “strength”. In any case, we have seen that the CS scales in terms of degrees of insistent pointing towards the intended referent may be predicted on the basis of more fundamental discourse-interactional values; and it is likely that the GH may similarly be subsumable under a more precise discourse-interactional characterization of each of the form types represented on the Hierarchy.

FG ‘NewTops’, on the other hand (the most problematic of the four subtypes recognised in the theory), clearly fall within the ‘FOCUS’ system distinguished in CS theory. In fact, where such NewTops are introduced in postverbal position (as is most often the case in Dik’s 1997a presentation: see (18) below for an illustration), they would be viewed in CS theory, as we saw earlier, as being ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’ —that is, as not worthy of the addressee’s attention at all! So here we have what at first sight is a diametrically opposite analysis of a given form type by each theory. Actually, as we saw in the case of the comparison between non-inverted constructions such as (4a) and inverted ones such as (4b), the contrast is a paradox rather than a true contradiction, since CS is saying that Dik’s NewTops are non-topical (which is correct, as we shall see below), while in FG they realize one type of Focus (in the Information Structure sense); and clearly, both statuses can simultaneously characterize the same given constituent. In fact, even within FG as they are defined in Dik (1997a: Ch.13), they can be analyzed as simply constituting in the unmarked case one type of ‘Completive Focus’, since we are dealing here with the introduction of a referent which is anticipated to play a role in the subsequent discourse. Dik (1997a: 312) in fact specifically mentions NewTops in illustrating the possibility of overlap between topical and focal elements in a discourse. He characterizes NewTops as the introduction of new participants or entities about which the speaker intends to say something later on, and by virtue of that introduction, as constituting the main point of the containing utterance. His example of this is (18):

(18) *All of a sudden we saw A GIGANTIC SHARK.* (Dik, 1997a: ex. (6), Ch. 13)

However, it is debatable whether in fact the referent of the NP *A GIGANTIC SHARK* in this context (in fact, a *thetic* utterance) is topical at all —that is, whether the utterance of (18) may be construed as a *categorical* rather than *thetic* one, and “about” ‘a gigantic shark’: witness the incoherence of # “As for a gigantic shark, all of a sudden we saw one/it”). Applying Erteschik-Shir’s (1997) “lie-test” clearly shows that the content of *a gigantic shark* in (18) is part of the focal information conveyed via this utterance:

(18’) A: *All of a sudden we saw A GIGANTIC SHARK.*

B: *That’s not true! It was a BABY WHALE.*

The notion of NewTop is in fact an incoherent one itself, if it is conceived (as I believe it must be) in discourse-contextual terms. After all, discourse topics do not emerge fully-fledged just through being introduced into a given discourse; they have to be *established*, and then *maintained* if they are not to fade from salience or be superseded by subsequent topics (see Cornish 1998 for some discussion). New topics may be established on the basis of the introduction of a new referent into a discourse, as in the case of *a gigantic shark* in (18); but I think that it is a mistake to believe that the referents of such expressions *ipso facto* have the status of topics. Topic introduction and establishment is now widely conceived within the literature as being a joint, cooperative undertaking, involving the coordination of both speaker and addressee, and is not the prerogative of the sole speaker. In any case, all the examples of NewTops presented in Dik's (1997a: 315-318) subsection on NewTops (§ 13.3.1) in fact fall within thetic, not categorical utterances, where Dik specifically makes the point that such referents tend to be introduced via expressions occurring towards the end rather than at the beginning of the clause.

4. Pragmatic functions within the new FDG model

Quite clearly, the assignment of pragmatic functions within the new Functional Discourse Grammar model (Hengeveld, this volume) must be part of the Interpersonal Level specified in the model, a level which subsumes and 'controls' the specifications made at the two lower levels in the system (those of 'Representation' and 'Expression'). The marking of information-structural relations at the level of the clause needs to be sensitive both to features of the communicative context, and to the speaker's evaluation of the addressee's current cognitive state. This can be done once the 'Cognition' and 'Communicative Context' components of the FDG model which feed and are in turn fed by the Interpersonal Level (as indicated in Hengeveld, this volume: Fig. 1, pp. 3-4) are adequately fleshed out.

Adopting Hannay's (1991: 148) five modes of message management ("All-New information", "Topic", "Reaction", "Neutral" and "Presentative"), it is clear that this initial planning stage must be situated at the Interpersonal Level recognised in the FDG model, where communicative intentions are formed, expressed minimally by the Move, which is realized by one or more constituent Discourse Acts (see also for a more specific elaboration of this component, Van den Berg's 1998 "pragmatic" and "message" modules within his "pragmatic functional grammar" model; here, pragmatic functions are handled by the "message module" (1998: 100). I assume his "pragmatic" module would correspond to Hengeveld's FDG model "Interpersonal Level", and that his "message" module would correlate with the FDG "Representational Level"). Examples illustrating Hannay's message management modes presented so far in this chapter are (1b) and (3a) for "All-New", (1a) for "Topic", and (3b) and (4b) for "Presentative". The "Neutral" mode is said not to involve an initial Topic or Focus expression and comprises a "dummy" subject (*it* or *there*). An example would be *It was surprising that the Greens won the election*. As for the "Reactive" mode, it involves the preposing of immediate, expressive-subjective material bearing the Focus function, as in Hannay's (1991: 143) example (2b): (2) Q: *Did you get wet?...* (b) *Wet? Bloody soaking I was*.

Now, clearly, each message management mode, with the exception of the first (the “All-New” mode), presupposes a specific kind of context. This must be represented in the Communicative Context component, whose task is to provide a representation of the discourse developed prior to the utterance about to be produced, as well as of the prevailing situational context. A very important part of this discourse representation must be (a) an indication of the current (local and global) macro-topics and (b) the structure of this discourse (i.e. the level or ‘unit’ of the discourse under development which the discourse has reached). The “Presentative”, “Neutral” and “All-New” modes may serve to initiate a new discourse unit, since their essential function is to introduce new referents or states of affairs. In the case of the “Presentative” mode, as we saw in example (4b), there is often a preposed thematic locative, temporal (or more generally, circumstantial) phrase introducing the constituent manifesting it; in which case, the content of the clause as a whole is presented as tightly connected with the preceding co-text. Thus, such clauses may serve either as transitions between one discourse unit and the next, or as links between utterances within the same unit.

Constructions realizing the “All-New” mode, however, introduce wholly new situations or events, and re-set the space, time and thematic coordinates within a given discourse. In the case of “Reaction mode” clause realizations, these are mainly restricted to face-to-face spoken language of a dialogic kind (as in the illustrative example given above); as its very name suggests, the Reaction mode presupposes a ‘first pair-part’ to which it constitutes a “reaction”. Thus, its clausal exponents are restricted to occurring within minimal spoken discourse units (the adjacency pair in conversational discourse). The “Topic” mode too — that is, where the Topic type at issue is a GivTop — is by definition restricted to intra-unit occurrences. In terms of the intra-clause Topic functions, most clearly, ResTops (manifesting the highest level of CS deicticity of the three discourse-bound FG Topic functions) would refer to an entity evoked within an earlier, distinct discourse unit in relation to the one in which their exponents occur. But (as Dik, 1997a: Ch. 13 himself implies), they could not open a new discourse unit on their own (Dik claimed that a specific connective signalling the start of a new discourse unit is needed, presumably for this purpose). SubTops too may signal the start of a new discourse unit, but one which is clearly subordinate to the immediately preceding one - or which is at least at the same level of subordination as this unit.

Whereas the Communicative Context component within the FDG model must clearly keep track of the preceding current discourse, as we have seen, and must feed this information into the Interpersonal Level in order for it to be able to manage the organisation of future messages, the Cognitive component must contain long-term representations of both linguistic and non-linguistic kinds: encyclopedic information concerning real-world properties and relationships, as well as personal information assumed by the current speech participants to be mutually shared, and which is relevant to and evoked via the current discourse. It must also contain information regarding lexical-semantic relations between lexemes (such as hyponymy, meronymy, synonymy and antonymy), thus motivating the choice at the Expression Level of appropriate first restrictors within definite term structures manifesting GivTop or SubTop functions within the wider discourse (see Hannay, 1985b: (26)-(35), pp. 55-6 for the range of semantic or pragmatic relations in terms of which SubTops may be realized).

With this subsuming, controlling relationship between the higher-level Interpersonal Level and the lower, intermediate-level Representational one, which forms a message on the basis of the pragmatic structuring specified at the Interpersonal Level, Focus assignment or the lack of such assignment may be shown to have an effect on the semantic nature of the predicator selected at the lower Representation level, something which was impossible or very difficult to show under the standard model of FG (Dik 1997a: Ch. 13). Bolkestein (1998: 204-6) likewise gives Latin examples where the assignment of Focus function to given constituents in a clause may block subject or object assignment to certain other constituents. Thus, in her words (p. 205), “the location of main Focus must be part of the *input* for the rule that takes care of syntactic function assignment”.

All these phenomena show clearly that pragmatic function assignment must take place before, and not after, the stages at which semantic and syntactic properties are established within the clause. In any case, as the various tests, such as the Question-Answer test for topichood and potential focus domains, clearly indicate, information from the wider discourse context in which a given clause is set is crucial for the assigning of pragmatic functions to relevant constituents within it.

5. Conclusions

Both theories (CS and FG, but CS more so than FG) need to take account more centrally of the ‘thetic’/‘categorical’ distinction in predicting possible Topic-Focus relations in discourse —and in doing so, CS theory needs to take on board the information-structural dimension of the flow of utterances in discourse, in addition to its purely topic-based account. It could usefully take cognizance of the fundamental FG distinction between ‘topicality’ and ‘focality’ in discourse, as distinct from the assignment of particular Topic or Non-Topic (i.e. ‘IN-FOCUS’ or ‘NOT IN-FOCUS’) roles to given constituents within the clause. As it is, its notion of ‘Focus of Attention’ leaves the ‘focality’ dimension totally out of account —even though its presence is implicit in CS analyses.

Under the conception where ‘FOCUS’ in CS is defined in terms of the addressee’s being instructed to concentrate or otherwise his/her attention on a given referent, it is basically no different from the system of ‘DEIXIS’ (at least under the ‘indirect’ strategy interpretation), whose signals likewise enjoin the addressee to accord different levels of attention concentration on a particular referent, as a function of its assumed degree of ‘obviousness’ for the addressee or reader - but where three degrees of ‘insistent urging’ rather than two, as for ‘FOCUS’, are involved. Viewed in this light, there is no essential difference between the two systems (apart, as we have seen, from the partially complementary set of clitic pronoun signals involved in coding each system). There would appear to be two interpretations where the FOCUS and DEIXIS signalling systems have differing functions: (a) where CS ‘FOCUS’ has the ‘cognitive/AI’ interpretation (where the referent concerned is simply assumed already to be at the forefront of the addressee’s consciousness at the point of use): here, the ‘FOCUS’ system signals what is considered to be topical or laying claim to the addressee’s conscious awareness, and the ‘DEIXIS’ system (under its “indirect” interpretation) indicates how to retrieve various sorts of discourse referents, given their already-existing ‘FOCUS’ level; and (b) where

the morpheme signalling ‘DEIXIS’ has the “direct” status of indicating the level of discourse importance of a given referent, from the speaker/writer’s point of view.

In fact, with the systems of DEIXIS and FOCUS, CS theory only concerns itself with topic/non-topic signalling in discourse —i.e. with *what* the speaker is or is not centrally talking about in a given utterance; his or her marking of what s/he wants the addressee to *do* with (or to) this referent (via the various types of Focus function, in the IS sense) appears to be left out of account.

FG, for its part, might usefully pay more heed to establishing criteria for determining the various ‘attention-focus’ or accessibility statuses of given referents in the flow of discourse, thus motivating the successful prediction of the use of the various subtypes of Topic expression in accessing them (this point is also made by Gómez-González 2001: 165). Finally, one of the four subtypes of FG Topics, NewTops, may I think be safely abandoned (since its provision is already catered for, in the unmarked case, by Completive Focus), thereby simplifying the system as a whole.

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